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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
PEGGY L. NICKLE,

Pl,aintiff-Respondent,

vs.

Case No.

12850

DOMINIC GUARASCIO,

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
, STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, Utah Code Annotated 77-61a-1
through 77-61a-39 (1963), for determination of whether
defendant owes a duty of child support.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendant was adjudged to be the parent of Lisa
Nickle and ordered to provide support payments in her
behalf by the District Court of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, presiding.

2
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff asks that the judgment of the Lower Court
be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff, a resident of Colorado, brought an action
under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act seeking a determination that defendant owed a duty
of support to Lisa Nickle, daughter of plaintiff, and for
judgment ordering defendant to provide support for Lisa's
benefit. The complaint discloses that Lisa was born on
April 14, 1967. The District Court of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson presiding, determined the Court had jurisdiction to hear the
matter and found that defendant is the father of Lisa
Nickle and ordered defendant to pay $50.00 per month
for her support. The defendant appeals only from the
jurisdictional ruling of the Lower Court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.
In answering plaintiff's complaint for child support
payments brought under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, Utah Code Annotated 77-6la-1
through 77-61a-39 (1963) ,1 defendant denied that he
statute in Colorado is Section 43-2-1 through 43-2-33
Colo. Rev. Stat. (1963).
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was the father of Lisa Nickle, putting before the Court
the issue of the paternity of the child. Defendant's sole
contention on appeal is that the action should be dismissed because a Colorado bastardy statute, Sections
22-6-1 through 22-6-6 Colo. Rev. Stat. (1963), provides
that no action may be initiated under that statute after
a child is 12 months old (Section 22-6-6) and a paternity
determination under the Reciprocal Support Act is subject to that statute of limitations, which bars this proceeding as Lisa was more than a year old at the time the proceeding was initiated. The major drawback to this contention is that the bastardy statute upon which defendant
relies was repealed in 1967 by the Children's Code (1967)
Perm. Supp. Colorado Rev. Supp. 22-6-1 through 22-6-7
(1963) , and under the new act an action to determine
paternity may be brought within five years after the birth
of the child, Section 22-6-1 (2). As the proceedings herein
were initiated under the Reciprocal Support Act within
five years of the birth of the child, defendant js left without an argument.
Plaintiff would submit that even if the Colorado
bastardy statute upon which defendant relies were in
effect, defendant's argument would still be without merit
as the two cases cited by defendant in his brief do not
support his position. Yeager v. People, 116 Colo. 379, 181
P. 2d 442 (1947), cited by defendant holds only that the
bastardy statute is a civil statute while Wansley v. People,
64 Colo. 521, 173 P. 425 (1918), ironically supports plaintiff's position not defendants. In that case the Colorado
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Supreme Court held that paternity could be decided under
Colorado's Desertion and Non-Support Act, Section
43-1, Colo. Rev. Stat. (1963), and the one year Statute
of Limitations in the bastardy statute was not applicable
to the proceedings. The holding was not based upon the
fact that one statute was civil and one was criminal, as
defendant asserts in his brief, but upon the fact that the
statute of limitations for one statute could not govern an
action brought under another statute. This is made clear
by the case Dikeou v. People, 195 Colo. 573, 33 P. 2d 772
( 1934) , where the Court held that paternity could be
determined under a Colorado statute for Contributing to
Juvenile Dependency, a civil statute, and that the one
year statute of limitations for the bastardy statute was
not applicable. The Court stated:
"We have held that, although a bastardy prosecu·
ti.on under one statute is barred because not
brought in time, an action may still be maintained
under another statute for failure to support the
illegitimate child. Wansley v. People, 64 Colo. 521,
173 P. 425."
This holding is directly against defendant's position that
determination of paternity under URESA is subject to
the statute of limitations of the now repealed bastardy
statute.
Defendant's attempted classification of paternity ac·
tions as criminal or civil has also been rejected because of
the hybrid nature of such statutes.
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In M ________________ v. W ________________ , 227 N. E. 2d 469 (Mass.
1967), the petitioner brought an action under the Massachusetts Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act for support of her minor child. The Court rejected
defendant's contention that a paternity proceeding was
improper under the act holding that such a proceeding
could be decided under the Reciprocal Support Act on
the basis of the criminal support statute of Massachusetts:
"This commonwealth, by G. L. c. 273, Section 15,
places the father under a legal duty to support an
illegitimate child wherever begotten. Section 15 is
a criminal statute for it creates a misdemeanor.
Although criminal in form, it is sometimes regarded and used as a method of enforcing a support duty . . . In any event even though in form
a criminal statute, c. 273, Section 15, clearly establishes the civil duty of a natural father to support a child of his born out of wedlock. The question for decision is whether the existence of his
relationship to the child (that is, his paternity)
can be established in a civil proceeding under c.
273 A, [Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act J, where Massachusetts is a responding
state.
No practical considerations preclude having Massachusetts District Court determine paternity in
civil proceedings under c. 273 A. These courts
habitually make such determinations in criminal
proceedings under c. 273, Section 11-18 ..."
The holding which defendant seeks would unduly
restrict and complicate the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act and would be contrary to the liberal
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view heretofore taken by the courts to make this statute
operable. Maskil v. Green, 25 U. 2d 187, 479 P. 2d 343
(1971); Davidson v. Davidson, 405 P. 2d 261 (Wash.
1965).
POINT II.
DEFENDANT WAS NOT SUBJECTED TO
THE APPLICATION OF COLORADO CRIMINAL LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT
ACT PROCEEDING.
Defendant contends that failure to dismiss his com·
plaint amounts to application of Colorado penal law,
specifically Section 43-1, Colo. Rev. Stat. (1963), and
that the defendant should be extradited for such crime.
(Defendant is willing to suggest extradition because the
statute of limitations has now run.)
This argument has to be based on the premise that
the URESA proceeding applied to the four-year statute
of limitations under Section 43-1, as the one-year statute
of limitations under the now repealed civil bastardy Act
had run. As plaintiff has previously pointed out, the statute of limitations for bringing civil paternity actions in
Colorado is five years from the date of the birth of the
child, and not one year as defendant has assumed and
this fact again leaves defendant with no argument.
Regardless of the fact defendant is basing his argu·
ment upon a repealed statute, the simple answer to this
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contention is that the reciprocal proceeding was a civil
proceeding. The complaint asked for $50.00 per month
as support payments for Lisa's benefit and did not subject
defendant to any possible criminal liability. In contrast
to this civil proceeding, Section 43-1 is a felony with a
jail sentence up to five years. The fact that paternity
may be determined under both statutes certainly is no
basis to support the contention that Utah has applied a
Colorado penal statute. In any event, defendant's contention that he can only be tried in Colorado for the crime
of non-support is contrary to law:
"Under statutes containing no specific provisions
as to residence, [U. C. A. 76-15-1 is of this type]
it has been held that a father may be prosecuted
for non-support of his minor children in the state
of his residence, even though the children are residing outside that state." 44 A. L. R. 2d 886,906;
Re Alexander, 42 Delaware 461, 36 A. 2d 361
(1941); State v. Peoples, 112 S. C. 310, S. E. 813
(1908); State v. James, 100 A. 2d 12, Maryland
(1953).
Thus defendant's attempt to analogize the reciprocal
proceeding as an application of Colorado penal law is also
without merit.
POINT III.
DEFENDANT HAS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT COLORADO LAW APPLIES
IN THIS MATIER.
Section 71-6la-7 of Utah's Reciprocal Support Act
states:
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"Duties of support applicable under this act are
those imposed or imposable under the laws of any
state where the obligor was present during the
period for which support is sought. The obligor
is presumed to have been present in the responding state during the period for which support is
sought until otherwise shown." [Emphasis added.]
Plaintiff in this case seeks no support for past periods
when defendant was residing in Colorado or for maternity
expenses. The complaint and the judgment are limited
to $50.00 per month support beginning February, 1972
(R. 15, 16).
Under the clear wording of the statute the governing
law is the law of the state where defendant was present
for the period for which support is sought and not the
law of the state where the child was born. On this basis
plaintiff submits Utah law should apply in this action.
This position is supported by the case of M ________________ v.
w________________, supra, where the Court applied Massachu·
setts law in deciding the case, as the complaint sought
support for a period the defendant resided in Massachusetts, although the child was born in New York.
The Statute of Limitations under Utah's Uniform
Paternity Act provides only that an action cannot be commenced seeking damages for more than four years next
preceding the instigation of the complaint. U. C. A. 78·
45A-3 (1965).
Thus under Utah law as under Colorado law, defen·
dant is left without any argument.
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CONCLUSION
Defendant has based his entire argument upon a repealed Colorado statute. It is clear defendant has no case
under the legislation that superceded the repealed statute.
Even the one case defendant cites to support his position
under the repealed statute, supports plaintiff's position
not defendant's. Finally, the clear wording of the Reciprocal Support Act dictates that Utah law and not
Colorado law applies to the case, which again leaves defendant without an argument. For the above reasons,
plaintiff submits the Lower Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
KENT S. LEWIS
Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Respondent

